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 ﾠon	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠUnjust	 ﾠPhilosophers	 ﾠof	 ﾠRep.	 ﾠ7”	 ﾠ
Russell	 ﾠE.	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠhope,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠcommentary,	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠProfessor	 ﾠ
Weiss’s	 ﾠrich	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosopher-ﾭ‐rulers	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Republic	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠrather	 ﾠnarrowly	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosophers	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduties	 ﾠof	 ﾠruling	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
compelled:	 ﾠ	 ﾠexternally	 ﾠcompelled,	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠby	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠargument	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠruns	 ﾠcounter	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bulk	 ﾠof	 ﾠscholarship	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠpayoffs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠWeiss’s	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠblue	 ﾠdefender	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
traditional	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterpretation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinsist	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
competing	 ﾠview	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave	 ﾠon	 ﾠoffer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexpelled	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetition,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ
Weiss	 ﾠgives	 ﾠthree	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠcognates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠof	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠstrongest	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠ	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠforce	 ﾠor	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepercussions	 ﾠin	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
disobedience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠallegory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCave;	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠ“how	 ﾠ
unambiguously	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers’	 ﾠunwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCave	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠexpressed”;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠsheer	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompulsion”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(WEISS	 ﾠ
DRAFT,	 ﾠ26)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠignore	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠspace,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠstands	 ﾠor	 ﾠfalls	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠaddress.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sheer	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompulsion,	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersuade	 ﾠme.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPresumably,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
means	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsheer	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠcognates	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ‘ἕλκω’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠcognates),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠWeiss	 ﾠis	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠstrongest	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠuse	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠcognates	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠuse	 ﾠalone	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠor	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrequent	 ﾠuse	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠplenty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠdiscover	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠmeaning.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠallegory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCave	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpromising,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
stronger	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ515c7,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
prisoner	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠforced	 ﾠ(“ἀναγκάζοιτο”)	 ﾠto	 ﾠstand	 ﾠup,	 ﾠturn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠhead,	 ﾠwalk,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlook	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠasked	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatues,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠforced	 ﾠ(515d5;	 ﾠ
“ἀναγκάζοι”)	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthem	 ﾠclearly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠforced	 ﾠ
(515e1;	 ﾠ“ἀναγκάζοι”)	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfire,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠpainful	 ﾠand	 ﾠdazzling.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
occurences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’ have this sense is	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἕλκω’ which	 ﾠ
follow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprisoner	 ﾠis	 ﾠdragged	 ﾠby	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ(515e6;	 ﾠ“ἕλκοι τις 
αὐτὸν βίᾳ”)	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpath	 ﾠand	 ﾠdragged	 ﾠout	 ﾠ(515e8;	 ﾠ“ἐξελκύσειεν”)	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsunlight.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Something	 ﾠvery	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠin	 ﾠview	 ﾠat	 ﾠ519c9,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠjob	 ﾠas	 ﾠfounders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ(“ἀναγκάσαι”)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠnatures	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ascend	 ﾠand	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgood.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEvidently	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠforcible	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’ and	 ﾠits	 ﾠcognates,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
sense	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠcontext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBesides	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠsense,1	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠother	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’ and	 ﾠits	 ﾠcognates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPlato	 ﾠuses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠby	 ﾠargument.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠat	 ﾠGorgias	 ﾠ472b3-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠ
Socrates	 ﾠtells	 ﾠPolus,	 ﾠ“Nevertheless,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠI’m	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠI	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠagree	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
you.	 ﾠ	 ﾠYou	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠme	 ﾠ(οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις).”	 ﾠ(Zeyl	 ﾠtrans.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠsense	 ﾠquite	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠat	 ﾠRep.	 ﾠ611b9-ﾭ‐10:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Yet	 ﾠour	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠargument	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠus	 ﾠ(καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
soul	 ﾠis	 ﾠimmortal.”2	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠread	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠin	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠ521b7,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreading	 ﾠ
‘ἀναγκάζω’ in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrongest	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Then	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwill	 ﾠyou	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠ(Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις)	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠ
guardians	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity,	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
matters	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgood	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠother	 ﾠhonors	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠones,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠlife	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Nothing	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠreading	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠby	 ﾠforce	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
argument,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠby	 ﾠforce	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠin	 ﾠplay	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠin	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Nor	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠuses	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠforce,	 ﾠillegitimate	 ﾠor	 ﾠad	 ﾠhoc;	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠshift	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠmomentarily).	 ﾠ	 ﾠLikewise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ520a6-ﾭ‐b1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ516b8,	 ﾠGlaucon	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ“Necessarily	 ﾠso	 ﾠ(Ἀναγκαῖον)”	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠSocrates’	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprisoner	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsun	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
term	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠin	 ﾠPlato,	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠnow	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠbefore.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠat	 ﾠ519b7-ﾭ‐8:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Then	 ﾠisn’t	 ﾠit	 ﾠlikely,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ(τόδε οὐκ εἰκός . . .  καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων . . .).”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsense	 ﾠat	 ﾠ520d4:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠcity	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠprospective	 ﾠrulers	 ﾠare	 ﾠleast	 ﾠeager	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠmust	 ﾠof	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠ
(ἀνάγκη)	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠfree	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠwar.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ339e5.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠAll	 ﾠtranslations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠare	 ﾠby	 ﾠGrube/Reeve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
Observe,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠGlaucon,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwon’t	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠan	 ﾠinjustice	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho’ve	 ﾠ
become	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠcity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe’ll	 ﾠsay	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
compel	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(προσαναγκάζοντες)3	 ﾠto	 ﾠguard	 ﾠand	 ﾠcare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
just.4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘ἀναγκάζω’ and	 ﾠits	 ﾠcognates	 ﾠin	 ﾠPlato	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠnecessity:	 ﾠ	 ﾠAssuming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠwants	 ﾠx,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠy	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Phaedo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠ60b7,	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ“If	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠpursues	 ﾠand	 ﾠcatches	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠ[pleasure],	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbound	 ﾠto	 ﾠcatch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ[pain]	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ(ἐὰν δέ τις διώκη τὸ ἕτερον 
καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον).”	 ﾠ(Grube	 ﾠtrans.	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmodifications)	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠpleasure,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
insofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠpleasure,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠpretty	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠguaranteed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcatch	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpain	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPhaedo,	 ﾠ66b-ﾭ‐67b,	 ﾠemploys	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
above	 ﾠsenses,5	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠhypothetical	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠat	 ﾠ67a2-ﾭ‐4:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠNotice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“προσαναγκάζοντες” need	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhere	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrendered,	 ﾠ“when	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.”,	 ﾠrestricting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
temporal	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMore	 ﾠneutrally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtranslate,	 ﾠ“what	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsay	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠguard	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjust.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠneutral	 ﾠtranslation	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠ
range	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠsenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticipial	 ﾠphrase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠread	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas,	 ﾠ“what	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠsay	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠguard	 ﾠand	 ﾠcare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjust.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreading	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompulsion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠin	 ﾠb1-ﾭ‐d5,	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“We’ll	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.”	 ﾠof	 ﾠb1,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompulsion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWeiss	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
obviously	 ﾠunsound.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
611b9-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠ(cited	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ“Our	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠargument	 ﾠand	 ﾠothers	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠus.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ‘our	 ﾠ
recent	 ﾠargument’	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠof	 ﾠ608d-ﾭ‐611a,	 ﾠan	 ﾠargument	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ
received	 ﾠby	 ﾠcommentators.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnnas	 ﾠ(1981,	 ﾠ345)	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠit	 ﾠ“one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfew	 ﾠreally	 ﾠembarrassingly	 ﾠbad	 ﾠ
arguments	 ﾠin	 ﾠPlato,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthough	 ﾠGlaucon	 ﾠis	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠsatisfied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠ[another	 ﾠclear	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠto	 ﾠ520b-ﾭ‐d],	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠhave	 ﾠgood	 ﾠreason	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘others	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell’	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthough	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
exclusively	 ﾠto	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPhaedo,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoften	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠevaluations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
commentators.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquick	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠinferences	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
take	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠunsound	 ﾠarguments.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ‘προσαναγκάζω’	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠPhilebus	 ﾠ13b2-ﾭ‐3:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠthough	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwould	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠunlike,	 ﾠif	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠyou	 ﾠby	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ(τῷ λόγῳ εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι).”	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThe	 ﾠother	 ﾠoccurrences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠinclude:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(66b1)	 ﾠ“All	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthings	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠ(ἀνάγκη)	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠand	 ﾠsay	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.”;	 ﾠ(66b8)	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ
keeps	 ﾠus	 ﾠbusy	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠthousand	 ﾠways	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnurture	 ﾠ(διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν)”;	 ﾠ
(66d1)	 ﾠ“It	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcare	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠenslaved,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlive,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠto	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠand	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠ(ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ 
πᾶσα ἀνάγκη).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Grube	 ﾠtrans.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠto	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠ
association	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠit	 ﾠfunctioning,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠand	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠknowledge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfeed	 ﾠit	 ﾠand	 ﾠrest	 ﾠit	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠto	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠphilosophy.6	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcould	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠread	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠin	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠ540b3-ﾭ‐5:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“When	 ﾠhis	 ﾠturn	 ﾠcomes,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠrule	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
city’s	 ﾠsake,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfine,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠdone	 ﾠ(οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ ̓ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας).”	 ﾠ	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
regards	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠor	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfine	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
accept	 ﾠpain	 ﾠor	 ﾠattending	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfine	 ﾠ
things,	 ﾠso	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠread	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠas	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠregard	 ﾠ
contemplation	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfine,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
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(τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ)	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.”;	 ﾠ(67b3)	 ﾠ
“Such	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlove	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ(ἀναγκαῖον)	 ﾠsay	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠanother	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelieve.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Grube	 ﾠtrans.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠuses	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
alleviate	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠuses	 ﾠin	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘ἀπαλλακτέον’ of	 ﾠ66e1,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ“If	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠever	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpure	 ﾠknowledge,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠescape	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbody	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ.”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠa	 ﾠparallel	 ﾠto	 ﾠ‘καταβατέον’ at	 ﾠRep.	 ﾠ520c1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠ
conditional,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘οὖν’ does	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpreceded,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠowe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘γὰρ’ of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠnext	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠnext	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠruled	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠoff,	 ﾠ“for	 ﾠyou	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus.”	 ﾠ(c6)	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcity	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
precondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemplative	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠ‘καταβατέον’	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhere	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ‘ἀπαλλακτέον’ at	 ﾠ66e1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠever	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemplative	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠtake	 ﾠour	 ﾠturn	 ﾠruling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity,	 ﾠlest	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemplative	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐functioning	 ﾠcity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠvanish.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠApology	 ﾠ32a1:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠman	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreally	 ﾠfights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ(ἀλλ ̓ ἀναγκαῖόν 
ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου)	 ﾠlead	 ﾠa	 ﾠprivate,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic,	 ﾠlife	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsurvive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠtime.”	 ﾠ(Grube	 ﾠtrans.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
ruling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontemplation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLikewise	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Glaucon’s	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠat	 ﾠ520e1-ﾭ‐2:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“Each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠ
compulsory	 ﾠ(ὡς ἐπ  ̓ ἀναγκαῖον).”7	 ﾠ
So,	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhas	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠforcible	 ﾠ
compulsion.8	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers,	 ﾠas	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCave	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠother	 ﾠpassages,9	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠsome	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcompulsion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUntil	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomplete,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
course	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠembark	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠafter	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomplete,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
recognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠ
(themselves),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontemplation	 ﾠ(sufficient	 ﾠ
food,	 ﾠclothing,	 ﾠprotection,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠsupplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠothers)	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐functioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠmost	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmaintenance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠthey	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemplative	 ﾠlife.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠruling	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠexternally	 ﾠcompelled,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
prefer,	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemplation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ347d1,	 ﾠ358c4,	 ﾠ465c3.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠThough	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosophers	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠruling	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠfine	 ﾠ(540b4	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠtough	 ﾠhurdle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠclear),	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
pleasant,	 ﾠor	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠeven	 ﾠintrinsically	 ﾠvaluable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpleasant,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠruling:	 ﾠ	 ﾠcontemplation.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ519c9,	 ﾠ539e3,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ540a7,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“compulsory	 ﾠ
subjects”	 ﾠin	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ525b4,	 ﾠ537b2).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontemplation	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaintenance	 ﾠof	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
conditions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmaintenance.10	 ﾠ
Now,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠpush	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠdown	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
level.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSocrates	 ﾠenvisions	 ﾠrule	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠphilosophers,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
turn	 ﾠat	 ﾠruling.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠphilosopher	 ﾠrule	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
necessitate	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠphilosopher	 ﾠruling	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠshouldn’t	 ﾠone	 ﾠmember	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠher	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠruling?	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers	 ﾠpick	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠslack,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfree-ﾭ‐rider	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemplation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
full-ﾭ‐time,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnless,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠher	 ﾠfellow	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠexternally	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠher,	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠby	 ﾠthreatening	 ﾠto	 ﾠcut	 ﾠoff	 ﾠher	 ﾠresources	 ﾠor	 ﾠexpel	 ﾠher	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
group	 ﾠof	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwithout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠeach	 ﾠphilosopher	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsame	 ﾠmotivations	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠother,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠall	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠnow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠProfessor	 ﾠWeiss’s	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosophers	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠin	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠboat,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠthing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠto	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠget	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwant	 ﾠ–	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcontemplation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠruling	 ﾠduties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠin	 ﾠoutline,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠreading	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhandle	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠI	 ﾠset	 ﾠaside	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutset:	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers’	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠunwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCave	 ﾠand	 ﾠrule.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠone	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠare	 ﾠunwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠruling	 ﾠas	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠend.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠanother	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
willing	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsee	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend(s)	 ﾠthey	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠdo	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engage	 ﾠin	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠbigger	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠview,	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠWeiss	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalready	 ﾠanticipated	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠget	 ﾠat	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠpage	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAristotle:	 ﾠ
Hence	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpeople's	 ﾠlife	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠneed	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadded	 ﾠ[to	 ﾠvirtuous	 ﾠ
activity]	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠextra	 ﾠdecoration;	 ﾠrather,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠits	 ﾠpleasure	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠ
itself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠbesides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠalready	 ﾠgiven,	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠ
fine	 ﾠactions	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgood;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcall	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠjust,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠjust	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠor	 ﾠgenerous	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠ
generous	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠvirtues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠso,	 ﾠactions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
accord	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvirtues	 ﾠare	 ﾠpleasant	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠright.	 ﾠ(Nicomachean	 ﾠEthics	 ﾠ
I.8	 ﾠ1099a15-ﾭ‐21,	 ﾠIrwin	 ﾠtrans.,	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠmine)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠis	 ﾠcorrect,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠjust,	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠruling	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelish,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠpleasant	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvirtuous	 ﾠcharacter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠleast,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠin	 ﾠBook	 ﾠ2	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠboth	 ﾠgood	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsequences,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Socrates	 ﾠmust	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠruling	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgood	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsequences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠevidenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjust	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
ruling)	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsequences,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
valued,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjust.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠissue	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠWeiss	 ﾠgives	 ﾠsome	 ﾠattention	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPart	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠsays	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
passages	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠreadings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwrites	 ﾠ(27	 ﾠIN	 ﾠTHE	 ﾠ
DRAFT),	 ﾠ“One	 ﾠthing	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrusted	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcontemplating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForms	 ﾠ–	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ‘for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity’.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠreading	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoffered,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠunder	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfalse	 ﾠunder	 ﾠanother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠcontemplation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠend,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
city	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠcontemplation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
trusted	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠits	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
ultimate	 ﾠends.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
city	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthem	 ﾠup	 ﾠas	 ﾠunjust;	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠas	 ﾠunjust	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠPlatonic	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠis	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfor	 ﾠothers	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
care	 ﾠabout	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠjust.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠshould	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosophers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠas	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠends	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠfullest	 ﾠ
happiness?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdo	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠjob	 ﾠof	 ﾠruling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠends.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
None	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhow	 ﾠruling	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsequences,11	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠroom	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maneuver	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosophers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠanything	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠknock-ﾭ‐down	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠWeiss.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠsympathy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠher	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdone	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠissue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠmany	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCave	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠon	 ﾠus	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠvarieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠmove	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
definitive	 ﾠposition	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthese	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
philosophers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠway	 ﾠaround,	 ﾠasking	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠShould	 ﾠevery	 ﾠact/state	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsequences?	 ﾠ	 ﾠMaybe	 ﾠPlato	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjustice	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠpossessor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
consequences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠdepiction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠproject	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRepublic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠour	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsion	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠ7.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠWeiss’s	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠis	 ﾠright	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
contend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproper	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion.12	 ﾠ
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12	 ﾠThanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠBryan	 ﾠReece	 ﾠand,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠRoslyn	 ﾠWeiss	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBACAP	 ﾠaudience	 ﾠat	 ﾠAssumption	 ﾠ
College	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstimulating	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠ